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STRICT LIABILITY AND WARRANTY IN CONSUMER
PROTECTION: THE BROADER PROTECTION OF THE
UCC IN CASES INVOLVING ECONOMIC LOSS,
USED GOODS, AND NONDANGEROUS
DEFECTIVE GOODS
Shortly after the introduction of section 402A of the Restatement of
Torts (section 402A),' which provides for strict liability to the consumer,
a leading advocate of strict liability predicted that strict liability would
become the exclusive consumer protection law and that the word "warranty" soon would pass "quietly down the drain."2 The prediction has not
proved accurate. Lack of agreement among courts over whether strict
liability permits consumers to recover economic losses' and whether
strict liability extends to sales of used goods4 and goods that are defective but not dangerous' indicates that strict liability suffers from doctrinal confusion. In contrast, courts generally agree that the warranties
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) permit consumers to recover
economic losses' and extend to sales of used goods ' and goods that are
defective but not dangerous.' Further, recent judicial and legislative
developments have restricted and in some cases abolished traditional
warranty defenses, such as contractual disclaimers,' lack of privity," and
lack of notice 1 in consumer warranty actions. A comparison of section
402A and the UCC's warranties in the areas of economic loss, used
I Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A; see text accompanying notes 21-32 infra (explanation of § 402A).
" Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel(StrictLiability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV.
791, 804 (1966) [hereinafter cited as The Fall].In a sale of personalty, a warranty is a representation, express or implied, made by the seller as part of a contract of sale, having reference to the character or quality of the goods, and by which the seller promises to insure that
certain facts are as the seller represents them to be. Hausken v. Hodson-Feenaughty Co.,
109 Wash. 606, 611-12, 187 P. 319, 321-22 (1920).
3 See text accompanying notes 44-50 infra.
See text accompanying notes 57-63 infra.
See text accompanying notes 69-77 infra.
See text accompanying notes 51-56 infra.
See text accompanying notes 64-68 infra.
See text accompanying notes 78-85 infra.
See text accompanying notes 89-117 infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 118-38 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 139-60 infra.
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goods, and nondangerous defective goods shows that the UCC provides
consumers with broader protection than strict liability in these areas.
Under the common law, courts generally considered the buyer's acceptance of goods" as a waiver or release by the buyer of the seller's
responsibility for the quality of the goods." The Uniform Sales Act,
adopted in 1906, sought to ameliorate the harshness of this rule by providing that the buyer's acceptance of the goods did not discharge the
seller's liability for breach of warranty. 4 Under the Uniform Sales Act,
the buyer could recover damages for the seller's breach of express war16
ranties 5 and implied warranties of fitness and merchantability.
The Uniform Sales Act, essentially a codification of contract law, 7
allowed defendants in breach of warranty actions several contract
defenses. The defense of lack of contractual privity between the buyer
and the seller was the most criticized defense. 8 Other defenses available
" Acceptance of goods at common law was the receipt of the goods by the buyer with
intention to retain the goods, indicated by some action of the buyer sufficient to show the
buyer's intention. Brown & Bigelow v. Bard, 64 Misc. 249, 256, 118 N.Y.S. 371, 376 (1909);
Schmidt v. Thomas, 75 Wis. 529, 532, 44 N.W. 771,772 (1890). Under the Uniform Sales Act
and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), acts inconsistent with ownership of the goods by
the seller constitute acceptance. Uniform Sales Act § 48 (1906); U.C.C. § 2-606.
,3See, e.g., American Mfg. Co. v. A.H. McLeod & Co., 78 Fla. 162, 164-65, 82 So. 802,
802-03 (1919) (purchaser of defective rope waives defect by acceptance); Liquid Carbonic Co.
v. Coclin, 161 S.C. 40, 46, 159 S.E. 461, 463-64 (1931) (purchaser of defective soda fountain
waives defect by acceptance). See generally 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 708 (3d ed. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as WILLISTON]; 8 WILLISTON, supra, § 983. The special food warranty was
an exception to the rule that the seller was not responsible for the quality of his product
after the buyer's acceptance. The food warranty allowed a consumer of'adulterated food to
hold the seller of the food liable for the consumer's physical injuries without proving the
seller's negligence. See generally H. MELICK, THE SALE OF FOOD AND DRINK 1-32 (1936); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (StrictLiability to the Consumer, 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1103-10 (1960) [hereinafter cited as The Assault].
" UNIFORM SALES ACT § 49 (1906). See generally 5 WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 714.
"5 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 12 (1906). See generally 8 WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 970. An
express warranty arises when the seller represents a fact that induces a customer to purchase the seller's product. Adrian v. Elmer, 178 Kan. 242, 245, 284 P.2d 599, 602 (1955); E.I.

Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. E.L. Bruce Co., 174 Tenn.. 148, 156, 124 S.W.2d 243, 246
(1939); see text accompanying note 27 infra (express warranty under UCC).
" UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15 (1906). See generally 8 WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 981. Implied warranties arise by force of law when the circumstances surrounding the sale, such as
the relation between the parties and the subject matter of the sale, justify imposing an
obligation on the seller for the quality of his goods. Carmichael v. Lavengood, 112 Ind. App.
144, 150, 44 N.E.2d 177, 180 (1942) (en banc); Rogers v. Toni Home Perm. Co., 167 Ohio St.
244, 249, 147 N.E. 2d 612, 616 (1958); see text accompanying notes 28-29 infra (implied warranties under UCC).
" See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of ProductsLiability and the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Commentary on JudicialEclipses, Pigeonholes and CommunicationBarriers, 17

W. RES. L. REV. 5, 20-21 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JudicialEclipses] (Uniform Sales Act
represents common law of contracts).
" See, e.g., James, Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 192, 193-95 (1955) (society's interest in protecting health transcends commercial reasons for adhering to privity requirement); The Assault, supra note 13, at 1123 (remote seller who solicits consumers to use his
products should not escape responsibility for harm caused by his products by saying that
consumer lacks privity of contract). See also 8 WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 998, at 732 n.18.
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under the Uniform Sales Act included lack of timely notice by the buyer
to the seller of the seller's breach of warranty19 and the defense of contractual disclaimer of warranties.2 0 These defenses sometimes allowed manufacturers of defective products to escape liability for damages caused by
their defective products. 1
The UCC was adopted in 1952 in response to the inadequacy of the
Uniform Sales Act to deal with modern commercial problems.22 While
the purpose of the Uniform Sales Act was to codify contract law,' the
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended to modernize the law
of commercial transactions and to bring the law into line with current
business practices, 4 even to the point of rejecting classic contract prinPrivity of contract is the relation that exists between two or more contracting parties. Bonfils v. McDonald, 84 Colo. 325, 332, 270 P. 650, 653 (1928). See generallyR. EPSTEIN, MODERN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 9-24 (1980) [hereinafter cited as

EPSTEIN].

UNIFORM SALES ACT § 49 (1906) (seller not liable for breach if buyer fails to give
seller notice of breach within reasonable time). See generally, 8 WILLISTON, supra note 13, §
993; see also text accompanying note 140 infra (requirement of notice under UCC).
See Cudahy, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commerical Code, 47
MARQ. L. REV. 127, 127 (1963); Jaeger, How Strict is the Manufacturer's Liability?, 48
MARQ. L. REV. 293, 312 (1964). The Unform Sales Act did not have a specific provision dealing with disclaimers, but contained a general section authorizing disclaimers. UNIFORM
SALES ACT § 71 (1906); Cudahy, supra, at 127; Jaeger, supra, at 312. See gnerally 8
WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 993A. Disclaimers of warranties limit the seller's liability by
limiting the situations in which the seller can be in breach of warranty. Gladden v. General
Motors Corp., 83 N.J. 320, 330, 416 A.2d 394, 399 (1980); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-11, at 471-72 (2d ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS]; see text accompanying notes 89-107 infra
(disclaimers under UCC). Disclaimers should be distinguished from limitations on remedies,
which restrict the remedies available to the buyer once a breach occurs. 83 N.J. at 330, 416
A.2d at 399; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra,§ 12-11, at 471-72.
21 See, e.g., Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 57, 58-59 (N.D.Ill.
1935)
(manufacturer of defective windshield escaped liability because consumer was not in contractual privity with manufacturer), affd, 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937); Chiquita Mining Co. v.
Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 60 Nev. 142, 153, 104 P.2d 191, 195 (1940) (seller of defective
machine escaped liability by successfully asserting contractual disclaimer); Aaron Bodek &
Son v. Avrach, 297 Pa. 225, 228-29, 146 A. 546, 547-48 (1929) (seller of defective blankets
escaped liability by successfully asserting that buyer did not give notice of breach within
reasonable time).
I See Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 973 (Del. 1980) (UCC grew
from recognition that current laws were inadequate to deal with modern business
practices); Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367,
372-73 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn] (legislative and administrative developments
made Uniform Sales Act obsolete); Schnader, A Short History of the Preparationand Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 2 (1967) (Uniform Sales
Act failed to keep up with changing business practices).
' See The Assault supra note 13, at 1128-29 (Uniform Sales Act was a codification of
common law rules); Judicial Eclipses, supra note 17, at 20-21 (Uniform Sales Act was
codification of common law of sale contracts).
2 See Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 973 (Del. 1980) (major concern
of UCC is to establish sales law to deal effectively with contemporary realities); U.C.C. §
1-102(2)(A) (underlying purpose of UCC is to modernize law governing commerical transactions); Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 372-73 (UCC makes unwieldy modern commercial law accessible and clear).
19 See
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ciples.s In particular, the drafters of the UCC completely rewrote the
sections of the Uniform Sales Act regarding warranties.26 A person injured by a defective product has three possible warranties under the
Uniform Commercial Code through which he may recover damages. If a
seller makes a promise or affirmation of fact about goods which becomes
part of the basis of the bargain, the seller has made an express warranty
that the goods conform to the promise or affirmation.' If the seller
knows the purpose for which the buyer requires the goods, and that the
buyer is relying on him to furnish suitable goods, an implied warranty
arises that the goods are fit for the buyer's particular purpose.28 If a
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of the kind, an implied warranty of merchantability arises that the goods are fit for the ordinary purposes for which buyers use such goods." Despite its inclusion of the
criticized contract defenses of privity, notice, and disclaimer, every state
except Louisiana has adopted the UCC.1 0
I See JudicialEclipses, supra note 17, at 21 & n.57 (UCC rules relating to form, formation, and modification of sales contract replace common-law rules). In addition to rejecting
some contract principles, the UCC adds new doctrines that extend sales law beyond contracts. Id; see, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-203 (obligation of good faith in performance of contracts);
U.C.C. § 2-302 (relief from unconscionable contracts); U.C.C. § 2-316 (limitations on seller's
ability to limit buyer's warranties).
I See 8 WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 982, at 536 (UCC warranty sections are significantly different from Uniform Sales Act warraty sections); Llewellyn, Why a Commercial
Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 796-801 (1953) (UCC warranty sections reflect modern case
law).
. U.C.C. § 2-313; see, e.g., Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 358-59 (6th Cir.
1978) (newspaper and television advertisements created express warranty that drain
cleaner was safe for consumers to use); Valley Datsun v. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979) (used car salesman created express warranty by telling purchaser that car
was in excellent condition). See generally 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 16.04[4] (1981) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN]; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
20, §§ 9-2 to -5, at 327-32; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (tort liability for
express representation).
U.C.C. § 2-315; see Addis v. Bernardin, Inc., 226 Kan. 241, 245, 597 P.2d 250, 254
(1979). In Addis, the seller knew that the buyer wanted jar lids to accompany containers of
the buyer's highly acidic salad dressing and that the buyer was relying upon the seller to
furnish appropriate lids. Id. at 246, 597 P.2d at 254. The seller, however, furnished the
buyer with jar lids that were not compatible with acidic products. Id. The lids failed to seal
the jars adequately, and the buyer recovered damages for the seller's breach of the seller's
implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. Id. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 20, § 9-9, at 257-60.
U.C.C. § 2-314. The UCC provides that merchantable goods are goods that pass
without objection in the trade under the contract description; are of fair average quality;
are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; are of even kind, quality,
and quantity; are adequately contained, packaged, and labelled; and conform to any promise
made on the container or label. Id; see text accompanying note 81 infra. See generally
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, §§ 9-6 to -8. The requirement that the goods must be fit
for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, U.C.C. § 2-314(2(c), is the requirement ususally identified with the warranty of merchantibility. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 20, § 907, at 349, 353.
' WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, § 1, at 1. A number of commentators have argued
that a state's adoption of a comprehensive sales law such as the UCC precludes the courts
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To free consumers from the entangling contract defenses surrounding the warranties of the Uniform Sales Act and the UCC 1 the American Law Institute adopted section 402A in 1965.2 Section 402A provides
that the seller of any dangerously defective product is liable for the
physical harm caused to the person or property of the ultimate user of
the product." An injured consumer need not show that the seller was negligent,' but only that the seller was in the business of selling the product,
that the seller put an unreasonably dangerous product on the market,
and that the defect caused the consumer physical harm." The justification for extending strict liability to sellers, according to the official commentary to section 402A, is that one who supplies people with products
that may endanger their health and property and who encourages the
public to rely on the safety of his product should not escape liability
when the product proves defective.3 6 The commentary further provides
that the basis of strict liability in section 402A is tort, and therefore the
UCC does not govern strict liability. 1 The defenses of lack of privity,
from adopting common-law tort theories such as strict liability which seek to circumvent the
statutory sales law. E.g., Dickerson, Was Prosser'sFolly Also Traynor's?,2 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 469, 469-88 (1974); JudicialEclipses, supra note 17, at 18. Contra Wade, Is Section
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REV. 123, 136-42 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Preemption]. The
Delaware Supreme Court had held that the UCC's provisions on sales pre-empt the adoption
of strict liability. Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980).
31 Section 402A, Comment m. The official commentary to section 402A states that warranty was originally a tort theory, but became so closely identified with contract law that
the warranty theory became an obstacle to the recognition of the seller's liability. Id.; accord, The Fal4 supra, note 2, at 801.
' See note 1 supra (text of § 402A). See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 18, at 57-67.
The American Law Institute adopted § 402A over the opposition of some of the Institute's
members. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict TortLiability ForProducts,44 Miss. L.J. 825,
830-31 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nature of Strict Liability] (describing opposition to the
"defective" requirement of § 402A). Schorlarly criticism of § 402A arose immediately after
its adoption. See, e.g., JudicialEclipses, supra note 17, at 34-35 (products liability suits
should not be classified solely as tort or contract); Smyser, Products Liability and the
American Law Institute: A Petitionfor a Rehearing,42 U. DFT. L.J. 343, 345-47 (1965) (case
law does not support extension of strict liability beyond food).
I Secion 402A; see, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Chiarello, 27 Ariz. App. 411,
414-15, 555 P.2d 670, 673-74 (1976) (strict liability under § 402A applies to manufacturer of
car with defective brakes); Marko v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 169 Conn. 550, 553, 364 A.2d 217,
219-20 (1975) (strict liability under § 402A appilies to manufacturer of soft drink bottle when
bottle explodes); see text accompanying notes 69-77 infra (dangerously defective requirement).
' Section 402A (2); see Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 329, 319
A.2d 914, 920 (1974). The Kuisis court pointed out that strict liability under § 402A looks to
the fitness of the defendant's product rather than to the negligence standard of whether the
defendant breached his duty of care. Id. at 329, 319 A.2d at 920.
1 Section 402A(1); accord, Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d
182, 188 (1965); The Fal4 supra note 2, at 840-42. See also text accompanying notes 69-73 infra (unreasonably dangerous requirement).
Section 402A, Comment f; accord, The FalI supra note 2, at 799.
Section 402A, Comment m; accord, Monsanto Co. v. Thrasher, 463 S.W.2d 25, 27
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970). The Monsanto court held that strict liability is a separate remedy
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lack of notice, and disclaimers are not available under section 402A.'
Since the adoption of section 402A, courts enthusiastically have received
strict liability. Forty states have adopted strict liability by judicial decision. 9 Four other states have adopted strict liability by statute." Only
six states continue to reject strict liability.4' The widespread acceptance
from the UCC since strict liability specifically covers the area of consumer protection, which
the UCC does not cover adequately. Id.
' Section 402A, Comments 1, m; accord, Haugen v. Ford Motor Co., 219 N.W.2d 462,
470-71 (N.D. 1974) (UCC defenses do not limit seller's strict liability).
" Fisher v. Bell Helicopter Co., 403 F. Supp. 1165, 1174 (D.D.C. 1975) (by implication);
Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d 128, 132-33 (Ala. 1976) ("extended manufacturer's
liability doctrine" provides that manufacturer is negligent as matter of law when manufacturer markets product not reasonably safe for its intended use); Clary v. Fifth Ave.
Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244, 248 (Alaska 1969; O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz.
556, 559-60, 447 P.2d 248, 251-52 (1968) (en banc); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 61, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700, 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1962) (en banc); Hiigel v. General
Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 63, 544 P.2d 983, 987 (1975) (en bane); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153
Conn. 284, 289-90, 216 A.2d 189, 192 (1965); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 86
(Fla. 1976); Stewart v. Budget Rent-a-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 75, 470 P.2d 240, 243 (1970);
Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 676, 518 P.2d 857, 859-60 (1974); Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 617-18, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186-87 (1965); Cornette v. Searjeant Metal
Prod., Inc., 147 Ind. App. 46, 52, 258 N.E.2d 652, 655-56 (1970); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672, 684-85 (Iowa 1970), affd, 199 N.W.2d 373 (1972); Brooks v.
Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 702, 545 P.2d 1104, 1108 (1976); Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib.
Co., 402 S.W.2d 441, 446-47 (Ky. 1965); Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 602,
250 So. 2d 754, 755 (1971) (UCC not adopted); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337,
340-46, 363 A.2d 955, 957-63 (1976); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 337-38, 154
N.W.2d 488, 500-01 (1967); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 364-65
(Mo. 1969); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513-14, 513
P.2d 268, 272-73 (1973); Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 435, 191 N.W.2d 601, 606
(1971) (personal injury only); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 413, 470 P.2d 135,
138 (1970); Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 38-39, 260 A.2d 111, 113
(N.H. 1969); Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 59-62, 207 A.2d 305, 311-12
(1965); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 735, 497 P.2d 732, 737 (1972); Codling v. Paglia, 32
N.Y.2d 330, 342, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29 (1973); Johnson v.
American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57, 66 (N.D. 1974); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50
Ohio St. 2d 317, 322, 364 N.E.2d 267, 270-71 (1977); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521
P.2d 1353, 1360-61 (Okla. 1974); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 470, 435 P.2d 806,
807-08 (1967) (en bane); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 427, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (1966); Ritter v.
Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 188, 283 A.2d 255, 261 (1971); Engberg v. Ford Motor
Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205, 205 N.W.2d 104, 109 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400,
419-20, 398 S.W.2d 240, 248-49 (1966); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789
(Tex. 1967); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 156-58 (Utah 1979);
Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 154-55, 333 A.2d 110, 113-14 (1975); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co.,
75 Wash. 2d 522, 531-32, 452 P.2d 729, 734-35 (1969) (en banc) (strict liability extends only to
manufacturers); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 680 (W. Va. 1979);
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
10 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.2 (Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106 (Supp. 1981); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (1980); S.C. CODE § 15-73-10 (1977).
" Haste v. American Home Prod. Corp., 577 F.2d 1122, 1124 (10th Cir.) (applying
Wyoming law), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 455 F.2d 967,
969 (4th Cir. 1971) (applying Virginia law); Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968,
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of strict liability has prompted some courts to suggest that strict liability
has superseded the UCO in products liability cases.42
Despite its rapid acceptance, strict liability has failed to develop into
the ultimate consumer remedy that its supporters envisioned. 3 The
courts have not found strict liability easy to apply. For example, courts
disagree on whether strict liability permits consumers to recover
economic losses and whether strict liability extends to sales of used
goods and goods that are defective but not dangerous.
Several strict liability cases decided before the adoption of section
402A allowed plaintiffs to recover solely economic losses.44 Section 402A,
however, provides only that the seller is liable for the consumer's
physical harm. 5 Leading proponents of strict liability have stated that
recovery of economic losses, such as loss of bargain and loss of profits, is
essentially a contract remedy and therefore is not consistent with strict
liability." Accordingly, most courts do not allow consumers to recover
economic losses under a strict liability theory.47 Other courts, however,
980 (Del. 1980); Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 630-31, 378 N.E.2d 61, 63-64
(1978); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 74 Mich. App. 532, 535, 254 N.W.2d 569, 571 (1977);
Fowler v. General Elec. Co., 40 N.C. App. 301, 304, 252 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1979).
42 See, e.g., Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 712 (10th Cir. 1974)
(dictum) (many jurisdictions have abandoned implied warranties in favor of strict liability in
consumer protection); Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 429, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 373 (1969) (dictum) (strict liability virtually has superseded implied warranties in
cases involving personal injuries from defective products); accord, Priest, A Theory of the
Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1308 n.77 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Priest] (warranties currently are irrelevant in recovery for personal injury losses because of
acceptance of strict liability).
" See generally Shanker, A Reexamination of Prosser'sProductsLiability Crossword
Game, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 550 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Crossword Game].
" See, e.g., Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply Inc., 353 Mich. 120,
126, 90 N.W.2d 873, 876 (1958) (plaintiff recovered damages for lost business); Mazetti v.
Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 630, 135 P. 633, 636 (1913) (plaintiff recovered damages for loss
of business reputation and profits).
'" Section 402A; see note 1 supra (text of § 402A).
" See The Fal supra note 2, at 821-23 (strict liability should not extend liability for
loss of bargain to manufacturer since buyer's bargain will depend on dealings between
retailer and consumer); Preemption,supra note 30, at 142 (strict liability should not extend
to recovery of economic losses since economic losses are contractual in nature and recovery
in tort actions should be confined to physical injuries and consequential damages).
", See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 283-86 (Alaska 1976)
(buyer of defective mobile home who suffered only economic loss could not recover damages
under strict liability theory); Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14, 17-18, 515 P.2d 41,
44-45 (1973) (buyer of defective diesel truck could not recover economic losses under strict
liability theory); Henderson v. General Motors Corp., 152 Ga. App. 63, 64, 262 S.E.2d 238,
239-40 (1979) (buyer of car could not recover economic loss under strict liability theory); accord, Speidel, ProductsLiability, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L. REV. 309, 318,
327 (1973) (applying strict liability to economic losses will deprive the seller of opportunities
to allocate commercial risks in contract with buyer). See generally Edmeades, The Citadel
Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in American ProductsLiability, 27 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 647 (1977); Note, Economic Losses and Strict Products Liability: A Record of
Judicial Confusion Between Tort and Contract, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 118 (1978).
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have rejected the distinction between physical harm and economic loss
and allow the buyer to recover his economic losses from the seller of the
defective product.48 In Santor v. A&MKaragheusian, Inc., 4 for example,
the New Jersey Supreme Court permitted a consumer who purchased
defective carpeting to recover his damages for loss of bargain under a
strict liability theory on the ground that the seller should not escape
liability because the consumer suffered an economic loss rather than a
personal injury. 0
In contrast, the UCC permits recovery of economic losses in a breach
of warranty case." Recovery of economic losses is possible under the
UCC whether the sale of the defective goods was a commercial transaction" or a consumer transaction.53 Some courts have held that the UCC
liability in recovery of economic losses.' In
completely pre-empts strict
Seely v. White Motor Co.,55 for example, the California Supreme Court

" See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 Ill. Ap. 3d 136, 139-46, 414
N.E.2d 1302, 1306-11 (1980) (damages for loss of profits due to defective storage tank
recoverable under strict liability); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602,
604-10, 182 N.W.2d 800, 808-11 (1970) (damages for loss of bargain and cost of making repairs
on defective golf carts recoverable under strict liability); City of La Crosse v. Schubert,
Schroeder & Assoc., Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 44-45, 240 N.W.2d 124, 127-28 (1976) (cost of making
repairs on defective roof recoverable under strict liability).
'9 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1964).
Id. at 60, 207 A.2d at 309.
51 See U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (plaintiff can recover damages for loss of bargain); U.C.C. §
2-715(2)(a) (plaintiff can recover damages for loss of profits); U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (plaintiff can
recover consequential damages for injuries to person or property). See generally WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 20, § 11-8, at 414.
" See, e.g., Industrial Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp., 485 F. Supp. 793, 803-04 (D. Minn.
1980) (retailer recovered lost profits from manufacturer of defective radios under warranty
theory); Western Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 810 (Wyo. 1980)
(retailer recovered damages for loss of bargain from manufacturer of defective water tank
under warranty theory).
" See, e.g., Miles v. Kavanaugh, 350 So. 2d 1090, 1093 (Fla. App. 1977) (buyer of defective airplane recovered damages for cost of repair and loss of use under breach of warranty
theory); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 289-92 (Alaska 1976) (buyer of
defective mobile home recovered damages for loss of bargain under breach of warranty
theory). Courts generally interpret privity requirements more strictly when the consumer
suffers only economic loss than when the consumer suffers personal injury. See, e.g., Flory
v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 129 Ariz. 574, 577-79, 633 P.2d 383, 386-88 (1981) (en banc) (lack of
privity barred buyer of defective mobile home from recovering economic losses under
breach of warranty theory); State ex rel. Western Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 250 Or.
262, 266-68, 442 P.2d 215, 217-18 (1968) (en banc) (lack of privity barred buyer of defective
seeds from recovering loss of profits under breach of warranty theory), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1093 (1969). See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, §§ 11-5 to -6, at 406-10.
"See, e.g., Superwood Corp. v., Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 161-62 (Minn.
1981) (policies underlying strict liability do not support extending strict liability to economic
losses); Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 79-83 (Tex. 1977) (strict
liability applies only in cases involving physical harm while UCC governs cases involving
economic losses).
63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
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held that strict liability permits consumers to recover damages only for
their physical harm and cannot displace the UCC's provisions governing
recovery of economic losses. 6
In addition to judicial confusion over whether strict liability allows
recovery of economic losses, disagreement exists among courts that
have adopted strict liability over whether strict liability should extend
to sellers of used goods. 57 In Turner v. InternationalHarvester Co.,58 the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that strict liability should extend to
sellers of used goods since sellers of used goods can spread the cost of insuring against injuries. 9 Some courts, however, have held that strict liability does not extend to sale of used goods for the reason that the buyer
of used goods does not have the same reasonable expectation of quality
that a buyer of new goods enjoys." Other courts have refused to extend
strict liability to sellers of used goods since sellers of used goods cannot
pressure manufacturers to make a safer product. 1 In Peterson v. Lou
Id. at 14, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21, 403 P.2d at 149.
7 See generally, Metzger, Products Liability and the Seller of Used Goods, 15 AM.
Bus. L.J. 159, 161-69 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Metzger]; Note, Sales of Defective Used
Products: Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 (1979); Note, Protecting
the Buyer of Used Products:Is Strict Liabilityfor CommercialSellers Desirable?,33 STAN.
L. REV. 535 (1981).

11133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975).
19Id. at 289, 336 A.2d at 69; accord, Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 306-10 (Tex.
1975) (§ 402A applies to sellers of used goods as well as sellers of new goods). The official
commentary to § 402A suggests that manufacturers can spread the costs of accidents
resulting from their products by insuring against such accidents and passing the costs along
to their customers as a cost of doing business. Section 402A, Comment f; accord, Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). By spreading the costs of accidents evenly among all consumers, strict liability may
benefit those consumers who are relatively careless. See Owen, Rethinking the Policies of
Strict ProductsLiability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681, 706-07 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Owen]
(not fair or efficient for prudent consumer to pay to insure his less prudent neighbors);
Priest, supra note 42, at 1350-51 (consumers who are relatively more careless benefit from
cost-spreading theory).
" See, e.g., Rix v. Reeves, 23 Ariz. App. 243, 245-46, 532 P.2d 185, 187-88 (1975) (buyer
of used wheel rim could not expect same level of quality as buyer of new rim); Tillman v.
Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 755-56, 596 P.2d 1299, 1303-04 (1979) (sale of used crane does
not generate sufficient expectation of safety to justify imposition of strict liability); accord,
Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 268, 279-83, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 789, 796-98 (1980) (citing Tillman as rule governing sales of used goods in California).
"l See Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 756, 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 (1979). The
Tillman court noted that sellers of used goods, unlike retailers in the original chain of distribution of goods, have no continuing relation with the manufacturer and cannot exert
pressure on the manufacturer to reduce the risk of injuries by making a safer product. Id.;
accord, Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 268, 283, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 789, 798 (1980); cf. Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837, 843-44 (Miss.
1971) (seller of used goods does not meet definition of seller in § 402A). See also Henderson,
Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of the
Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1036, 1081-1085 (1980) (imposing strict liability on commercial sellers of used goods will raise prices and drive consumers to riskier noncommercial
sellers).
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Bachrodt Chevrolet Co.,"2 for example, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to extend strict liability to a used car dealer on the ground that a
used car dealer, unlike a retailer or wholesaler of a new car, cannot exert
pressure on the car's manufacturer to enhance the safety of his
product."
In contrast to the confusion over whether strict liability protects a
buyer of used goods, the UCC expressly applies to sale of used goods.64
For example, courts have found that implied warranties arise in sales of
used cars, saunas, and icemakers 5 The official commentary to the UCC,
however, provides that sellers of used goods have only such obligations
for the quality of the product they sell "as are appropriate to the sale of
used goods."6 Accordingly, courts have held that the seller of used
goods does not breach his warranties if he sells goods containing latent
defects67 or defects which the buyer had notice of before the sale."
In addition to disagreeing over whether strict liability permits
recovery of economic losses and whether strict liability extends to
sellers of used goods, courts also disagree over whether the consumer
who seeks to recover damages under a strict liability theory must show
that the seller's product was both dangerous and defective. 9 Section
402A requires the consumer to show not only that the seller put a defec62

61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975).

" Id.at 20-21, 329 N.E.2d at 786-87. If a seller of used goods makes substantial changes
prior to sale, strict liability will apply. See Green v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d
819, 833, 115 Cal. Rptr. 685, 697 (1974) (stict liability applies to seller of used crane who
made extensive modifications on crane); Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336,
344-45, 322 A.2d 440, 444 (1974) (strict liability applies to used car dealer for damages
resulting from defective repairs).
See generally Metzger, supra note 57, at 170-85; Comment, UCC Implied Warranty
of Merchantability and Used Goods, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 630 (1974); Note, Used Goods and
Merchantability,13 TULSA L.J. 627 (1978).
" See McNamara Pontiac, Inc. v. Sanchez, 388 So. 2d 620, 621 (Fla. App. 1980) (used
car dealer breached warranty of merchantability by selling defective car); Centennial Ins.
Co. v. Vic Tanney Int'l, 46 Ohio App. 2d 137, 144, 346 N.E.2d 330, 335 (1975) (implied warranty of merchantability arises in sale of used sauna heater); Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v.
Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 860-63, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492-93 (1972) (implied warranty of merchantability arises in sale of used ice-maker).
66U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 3.
See Fuquay v. Revels Motors, Inc., 389 So. 2d 1238, 1239-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980). The Fuquay court held that the seller of a used car who did not know and could not
have known about an alleged design defect in the car did not breach his warranty of mercantability to the buyers. Id.
" See Richards v. Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 1084, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979) (seller of used houseboat did not breach implied warranty of merchantability when
buyer had notice of defect prior to sale).
69 See generally FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, § 16A[4][g]; Coleman, Strict Liability in Tort: Defect Need Not Render Product "Unreasonably Dangerous," 49 WASH. L.
REv. 231 (1973); Owen, supra note 59, at 685-91; Nature of Strict Liability,supra note 32, at
828-38; Comment, Elimination of "Unreasonably Dangerous" from Section 402A-The
Price of Consumer Safety?, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 25 (1975).
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tive product on the market, but also that the defect made the product
unreasonably dangerous2 0 The unreasonably dangerous requirement
serves to distinguish cases involving physical injuries from cases involving only economic loss,"' but the requirements also may prevent a consumer who suffers personal or property damage from recovering under
strict liability. For example, a farmer who suffers personal injuries in an
accident involving a combine and who seeks to recover damages from
the manufacturer of the combine under a strict liability theory must
show not only that the combine contained a defect but also that the
defect made the combine unreasonably dangerous.72 Similarly, a homeowner who suffers property damage as a result of a defect in a television
must prove not only the existence of a defect but also that the defect
made the television unreasonably dangerous in order to recover under
strict liability theory."3
To relieve the consumer from problems of proof, some courts do not
require the consumer who seeks to recover damages under a strict
liability theory to prove that the seller's product was both defective and
unreasonably dangerous. The California Supreme Court, for example, in
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,74 rejected the section 402A requirement
"0Section 402A; see note 1 supra (text of § 402A). The commentary to § 402A provides
that strict liabililty will not apply to sellers of products that may be dangerous but that are
not unreasonably dangerous. Section 402A, Comment i. For example, butter may be dangerous because it deposits cholesterol in the arteries, but butter is not unreasonably dangerous
unless it contains a foreign substance, such as poisonous fish oil. Id.
U' See Nature of Strict Liability, supra note 32, at 832. The § 402A
requirement that
the defect be dangerous distinguishes cases in which the defective product is not harmful,
such as a case involving an inoperative radio. Id. Such cases are contract problems and
strict liability should not apply. Id,2 See Eickelberg v. Deere & Co., 276 N.W.2d 442, 444 (Iowa 1979). The Eickelberg
plaintiff suffered injury when his hand was caught in the machinery of a combine. Id. at 443.
He brought a strict liability action against the manufacturer of the combine. Id at 443-44.
The trial court instructed the jury that the -jury had to find that the combine was unreasonably dangerous to return a verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 444. The jury returned a verdict
for the manufacturer, and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial court's instruction
was erroneous. Id The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's instructions as a correct statement of the doctrine of strict liability. Id. at 444-45.
" See Black v. General Elec. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 195, 201-03, 278 N.W.2d 224, 229-31 (1979).
In Black a fire, allegedly started by a defective television, destroyed the plaintiffs home. Id.
at 225. The plaintiff brought a strict liability action against the manufacturer of the television. Id The trial court instructed the jury that the jury had to find that the television was
unreasonably dangerous in order to return a verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 226. The jury
returned a verdict for the manufacturer, and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial
court's instruction was erroneous. Id. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's instruction, noting that the unreasonably dangerous requirement is an essential element of a strict liability claim. Id. at 230.
74 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972) (en banc). In Cronin,
an
aluminum safety hasp holding bread trays broke, allowing the trays to slide from their
racks and strike the plaintiff on the back of the head. Id. at 124, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 435, 501
P.2d at 1155. The plaintiff sought to recover damages on a strict liability theory, and the
trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff. Id. at 124-25, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 436, 501 P.2d at
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that the buyer must prove that the seller's product was unreasonably
dangerous. The Cronin court reasoned that the unreasonably dangerous
requirement was a relic of negligence liability that was inconsistent with
strict liability. 5 Others courts have followed the Cronin decision. 6 Most
courts, however, reject Cronin and continue to require the consumer
who seeks to recover damages under a strict liability theory to prove
that the seller's product was unreasonably dangerous."
The consumer who seeks to recover damages for breach of warranty
under the UCC does not have to prove that the defective product is dangerous. 8 The UCC applies to all transactions in goods," whether or not
the goods are dangerous. 0 The consumer who seeks to recover for
breach of implied warranty of merchantability can show that the seller's
goods are unmerchantable by showing that the goods are not fit for the
ordinary purposes for which consumers use such goods.81 For example,
sellers of weak wine, peeling paint, and inoperative radios breach their
warranties of merchantability." Similarly, the consumer who seeks to
recover for breach of the seller's express warranty does not have to
show that the seller's goods are dangerous, but only that the seller's
goods did not conform to the seller's promises or descriptions relating to
the goods. 3 For example, a seller of mislabeled seeds breaches his ex-

1156. The defendants appealed on the ground that the hasp was not unreasonably dangerous, and the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at
127-35, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 438-43, 501 P.2d at 1158-63.
" Id. at 132-33, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441-42, 501 P.2d at 1161-62.
"' E.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209, 213-14
(Alaska 1975), modified on other grounds, 555 P.2d 42 (1976); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co.,
480 Pa. 547, 555-56, 391 A.2d 1020, 1024-27 (1978); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.,
253 S.E.2d 666, 680, 683 (W. Va. 1979).
E.g., Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 266, 550 P.2d 1065, 1067-68 (1976) (en bane);
Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1362-63 (Okla. 1974); Brown v. Western
Farmers Ass'n, 268 Or. 470, 475 & n.5, 521 P.2d 537, 539 & n.5 (Or. 1974) (en banc).
78 See Dickerson, Products Liability: Dean Wade and the Constitutionalityof Section
402A, 44 TENN. L. REV. 205, 215 (1977) (standard of defectiveness in UCC and § 402A differ
only in that plaintiff who seeks to recover under § 402A must prove that product was
dangerous as well as defective); Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity"Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REV. 804, 825 (1965 (difference between § 402A and UCC is that § 402A requires that product be dangerous as well
as defective).
7' U.C.C. § 2-102.
'o Courts have found that the UCC's warranties arise in the sale of a number of nondangerous products. See note 65 supra; note 82 infra.
" U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c); see note 29 supra.
82 See Regina Grape Prod. Co. v. Supreme Wine Co., 357 Mass. 631, 635, 260 N.E.2d
219, 221 (1970) (seller of weak and discolored wine breached warranty of merchantability);
Chatfield v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 266 N.W.2d 171, 172 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam) (seller of
paint that peeled permaturely breached warranty of merchantability); Mintz v. Daimler-Benz
of North America, Inc., 73 Misc. 2d 212, 214-15, 341 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782-84 (1973) (seller of inoperative radio breached warranty of merchantability).
' U.C.C. § 2-313; see note 27 supra.
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press warranty." In some cases, such as inadequately warning label
cases, the consumer does not have to show that the product was defec5
tive.1
Even though the UCC's warranties may provide broader protection
to consumers in cases involving economic loss, used goods, and nondangerous defective goods, the consumer's warranty action may be subject
to the warranty defenses of contractual disclaimers, lack of privity, and
Jack of notice. Courts are hostile to these defenses in cases involving consumer transactions, however, and have eroded, and in some cases even
abolished, these defenses. Recent judicial and legislative developments,
including the Magnuson-Moss Act, have restricted the seller's ability to
disclaim or limit the UCC's warranties.86 The UCC partially removed the
strict privity barrier, and courts and legislatures continue steadily to
weaken the privity requirements. 7 Finally, the UCC's notice requirements put a minimal burden on the consumer, and courts interpret
the notice requirements liberally in favor of consumers.8
The UCC permits the seller to disclaim warranties but severely
restricts the seller's ability to do so.8 9 To disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability, for instance, the disclaimer expressly must
mention merchantability." The seller also must make the disclaimer
See Agricultural Serv. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1064 (6th Cir.
1977) (seller who mislabeled okra seeds breached express warranty created by label on
seeds).
" See, e.g., Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 481-82, 253 S.E.2d 344,
348-49 (1979); Tuttle v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 585 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Okla. 1978). In Reid,
the plaintiff suffered personal injuries when the aerosol deodorant he was using burst into
flames when he struck a match immediately after applying the deodorant. Id. at 346. The
plaintiff brought an action for breach of implied warranty of merchantability against the
seller and the manufacturer of the deodorant on the grounds that the warnings on the can
were inadequate. Id at 347. The defendants contended that the plaintiff's action should fail,
since the plaintiff failed to show any defect in the deodorant or the can. Id- at 348. The
North Carolina Supreme Court rejected this argument for the reason that a failure to warn
of dangerous propensities of a product could constitute a breach of the warranty of
merchantability without a showing of defect. Id. at 348-49. In Tuttle, the plaintiff sustained
personal injuries when a tire on his car had a blowout. 585 P.2d at 1117. The plaintiff
brought an action for breach of warranty against the seller and the manufacturer of the tire.
Id- The defendants argued that the lack of proof of a defect in the tire barred the plaintiff's
action. Id. at 1120. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma rejected this argument, noting that the
absence of a defect is irrelevant to the question of the seller's liability under the UCC for
breach of warranty. Id. at 1120.
See text accompanying notes 89-117 infra.
See text accompanying notes 118-38 infra.
8 See text accompanying notes 139-60 infra.
" U.C.C. § 2-316. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, §§ 12-2 to -6, at
429-57.
" U.C.C. § 2-316(2); see, e.g., Jackson v. H. Frank Olds, Inc., 65 Ill. App. 3d 571, 578-79,
382 N.E.2d 550, 555 (1978) (disclaimer of implied warranty of merchantability in sale of used
car not effective since merchantability not mentioned in sales contract); Butcher v. GarrettEnumclaw Co., 20 Wash. App. 361,370, 581 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1978) (disclaimer of implied war-
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conspicuous." Disclaimers in small print92 or on the back of a sales contract 3 are not conspicuous.
Since the seller prepares the disclaimer, courts construe disclaimers
strictly against the seller in consumer transactions.94 For example,
courts carefully scrutinize consumer transactions to see if the consumer
actually understood the purpose and terms of any disclaimers, and will
find a disclaimer ineffective if the disclaimer did not become part of the
bargain between the parties. 5 In McNamara Pontiac, Inc. v. Sanchez,96
for instance, the court found that a disclaimer in a contract for the sale of
an automobile was not effective when the buyer's English illiteracy
prevented him from understanding the terms of the disclaimer.
ranty of merchantability in sale of portable sawmill not effective since merchantability not
mentioned in sales contract). The seller can disclaim the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose by a conspicuous writing. U.C.C. § 2-316(2); see Billing v. Joseph Harris
Co., 290 N.C. 502, 507-08, 226 S.E.2d 321, 324 (1976) (seller excluded warranty of fitness for
particular purpose in contract for sale of seeds). Disclaimers of express warranties are very
difficult for the seller to make. Any limitation or modification of express warranties is inoperative to the extent that it conflicts with the express warranty. U.C.C. § 2-316; see
Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 51-52, 286 N.E.2d
188, 200 (1972) (disclaimer in contract for sale of chickens was unreasonable since disclaimer
conflicted with seller's express warranty). The seller also can disclaim implied warranties
by use of such phrases as "with all faults" or "as is" in the sales contract. U.C.C. § 2-316(3(a);
see Koperski v. Husker Dodge, Inc., 208 Neb. 29, 42-43, 302 N.W.2d 655, 662-63 (1981) (seller
disclaimed implied warranties in contract for sale of car when contract provided that buyer
took car "as is").
", U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
92 See, e.g., Transcontinental Refrig. Co. v. Figgins, 585 P.2d 1301, 1305-06 (Mont. 1978)
(disclaimer in type no larger than rest of contract not conspicuous); Victor v. Mammana, 101
Misc. 2d 954, 955-56, 422 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351-52 (1979) (disclaimer in small print on label of can
not conspicuous).
"s See, e.g., R.C. Durr Co. v. Bennett Indus., Inc., 590 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Ky. App. 1979)
(disclaimer on back of sales contract not conspicuous); Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales,
Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 1011-12 (1976) (disclaimer on back of contract not conspicuous since seller
did not call disclaimer to buyer's attention).
" E.g., Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 114, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681, 690, 534 P.2d 377, 386
(1975) (dictum) (en banc; Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App.
3d 31, 45, 286 N.E.2d 188, 196 (1972) (dictum).
"s See, e.g., Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691, 697 (N.D. 1976) (disclaimer on
label of herbicide not effective when not brought to buyer's attention); DeCoria v. Red's
Trailer Mart, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 892, 896, 491 P.2d 241, 243-44 (1971) (disclaimer in contract
for sale of mobile home not effective when not explicitly negotiated between buyer and
seller).
388 So. 2d 620 (Fla. lbist. Ct. App. 1980). Shortly after the plaintiff purchased a used
car, the car caught fire and was destroyed. Id. at 621. The plaintiff brought an action against
the seller of the car for breach of implied warranty, and the seller claimed that the disclaimer of warranties in the sales contract barred the buyer's action. Id.
" Id.; accord, Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 142-44, 302 N.Y.S.2d
390, 393-95 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1969) (sales contract unconscionable and unenforceable when
buyer's English illiteracy prevented buyer from understanding disclaimers). But see Leff,
Unconscionabilityand the Code- The Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 523
(1967) (general unconscionability 'provisions should not apply to disclaimer that meets re-

quirement of UCC § 2-316).
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The UCC permits sellers to limit the consumer's remedies and to
disclaim the existence of warranties,98 but the UCC is stricter in allowing
limitations on remedies than in allowing disclaimers of warranties." For
example, the UCC does not allow the seller to limit his remedies in an
unconscionable manner. ' Limitations on the seller's consequential
damages presumptively are unconscionable when the consumer suffers
personal injuries,' ' but not when the consumer suffers only economic
loss or property damage.'0 '
In addition to not allowing enforcement of unconscionable limitations of remedies, the UCC disallows enforcement of a limited remedy if
the remedy fails of its essential purpose.'' A limited remedy fails of its
"8U.C.C. § 2-719. See generally WHITE &

SUMMERS, supra note 20,

§§ 12-8 to -12, at

462-85.
" See Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 131 N.J. Super. 439, 445-46, 330 A.2d 384,
387-88 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181 (1975). The Herbstman court
stated that the fact that the UCC distinguishes limitations of remedies from disclaimers of
warranties indicates that courts should construe limitations oft remedies more carefully
than disclaimers of warranties. 131 N.J. Super. at 445-46, 330 A.2d at 387-88; accord, Tuttle
v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 585 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Okla. 1978) (citing Herbstman for proposition that UCC is stricter in allowing limitations on remedies than disclaimers of warranties).
100 U.C.C. § 2-719(3). See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, § 12-11, at 471-81.
,01U.C.C. § 2-719(3); see, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 889, 430 S.W.2d
778, 781-82 (1968) (limitation of consequential damages in sale of truck was unconscionable
when defect in truck caused buyer's death); Tuttle v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 585 P.2d
1116, 1118-20 (Okla. 1978) (limitation of consequential damages in contract for sale of tire
was unconscionable when defect in tire caused personal injury). Consenquential damages
are damages which do not flow directly from the acts of the repudiating party, but are the
indirect results of such acts. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A. v. Ameropan Oil Corp., 372 F. Supp.
503, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); U.C.C. § 2-715(2). Incidental damages, on the other hand, are
damages normally incurred when a buyer or seller repudiates his contract. 372 F. Supp. at
508; U.C.C. § 2-715(1).
"I, See, e.g., Orr Chevorlet, Inc. v. Courtney, 488 S.W.2d 883, 886-87 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972) (contractual limitation of consequential damages barred recovery for loss of use due to
defect in car); Kleven v. Geigy Agric. Chem., 303 Minn. 320, 327-29, 227 N.W.2d 566, 571-72
(1975) (limitation of consequential losses in contract for sale of chemicals barred buyer's
recovery for crop loss due to failure of chemical). Limitations of consequential damages for
commercial losses are not presumptively unconscionable, but a court can find such limitations to be unconscionable. See, e.g., Select Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc., 640 F.2d 147,
149-50 (8th Cir. 1981); Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20, 22-23 (M.D. Ala.
1975); Frank's Maintenance & Eng'r, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d 980, 989, 408
•N.E.2d 403, 409-11 (1980). The Select Pork court found that the seller's limitation on consequential damages in a contract for the sale of swine was unconscionable since the sellers
were just entering the swine production field and knew that they might not be able to produce enough swine to meet their contract obligations. 640 F.2d at 149-50. In Majors v. Kalo
Laboratories,Inc., the court found that the seller's limitation on consequential losses was
unconscionable since the sellers were manufacturers of a new agricultural chemical of questionable effectiveness and the farmers who purchased the chemical faced potentially devastating commercial losses. 407 F. Supp. at 22-23. The C.A. Roberts court found that a limitation on the sellers' liability for consequential damages was unconscionable when the limiting
clause was not conspicuous and not made known to the buyer, and the defects in the goods,
steel tubing, were latent. 86 Ill. App. 3d at 989, 408 N.E.2d at 409-11.
103U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
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essential purpose when the remedy deprives the buyer of the substantial value of his bargain."°4 A contract for the sale of a new car, for example, may make repair and replacement of defective parts the exclusive
remedy. If the car has so many defects that the car is constantly in the
repair shop, the fact that the buyer's use of the car is limited may
deprive the buyer of the substantial value of his bargain.' 5 Similarly,
limitation of the remedy of defects discovered within a week of sale may
deprive the buyer of the substantial value of his bargain, since latent
defects may not appear until after a week.' 0 If the limited remedy fails,
the general remedies of the UCC, including incidental and consequental
10 7
damages, are available to the consumer.
While the UCC restricts the seller's ability to disclaim warranties
and limit remedies, several state legislatures have gone further and
made disclaimers and limitations ineffective in consumer transactions.1 08
West Virginia, for example, prohibits exclusions, modifications, or limitations of warranties in consumer transactions. 9' Ten other states have
restricted the seller's ability to disclaim or modify warranties." °
In addition to state legislation, Congress has bolstered the UCC's implied warranties through the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act."' The Mag"' Id. at Comment 2.

,o5See, e.g., Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 60 Ohio St. 2d 41, 45-48, 396 N.E.2d 761,
765 (1979) (exclusive remedy of repair and replacement failed of its essential purpose when
car was riddled with defects); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 420-22, 265
N.W.2d 513, 520-23 (limited remedy of repair or replacement failed of its essential purpose
when motor home was in constant need of repair). But see Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales,
478 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). In Lankford, the plaintiff claimed that the exclusive remedy of repair failed since his car was in the repair shop 45 days for 50 defects
during the first 18 months of use. Id. at 249. The court denied the plaintiff's claim, noting
that the warrantor repaired each defect promptly. Id. at 251.
", See Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 403-05, 297
N.Y.S.2d 108, 112-13, 244 N.E.2d 685, 691 (1968) (latent defects in unprocessed yarn made 10
day limit on notice fail of its essential purpose); cf. Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide
Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 1217-18 (3d Cir.) (15 day limitation on discovering and reporting latent
defects in chemical resins was unreasonable and unenforceable), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826
(1970).
ll U.C.C. § 2-719(2); see Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832, 834-35 (Utah 1981). In
Devore, the limited remedy of return of the purchase price, stipulated in a contract for sale
of a new car, failed of its essential purpose when the seller failed to return the buyer's purchase price within two months. Id. The court found that since the limited remedy failed the
buyer could recover incidental and consequential damages under the general remedy provisions of the UCC. Id. at 835.
" See generally Millspaugh & Coffinberger, Sellers' Disclaimersof Implied Warranties: The Legislatures Strick Back, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 160 (1979).
102 W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1980).
"'

§

ALA. CODE

§

7-2-316(5) (1977); CAL. CiV. CODE § 1792.4 (West 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (1981); MD. Co0i. LAW CODE ANN. §

50-639(c) (1976); ME.

2-316.1 (Supp. 1981);

MASS.

GEN.

LAWS

ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316A (West Supp. 1980); MIss. CODE

ANN. § 11-7-18 (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.

§

325G.18(2) (West Supp. 1981); VT. STAT.

ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316(5) (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-316, -719(3) (1981).
"' Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1976) (Magnuson-Moss Act). See generally Eddy, Effects of the
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nuson-Moss Warranty Act provides that if the seller offers any written
warranties on a consumer product, the seller cannot disclaim or limit any
implied warranties. The seller can restrict the duration of the implied
warranties to the duration of the written warranties if the seller sets
forth the limitation in clear, unmistakable language and prominently
displays the limitation on the face of the written warranty."' If a seller
provides a full warranty to consumers, however, the seller cannot limit
the duration of the written warranties."' Under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, the consumer has a private right of action in state or
federal court."' State law defines the nature of the damages the consumer may recover,"' but the Magnuson-Moss Act gives the successful
plaintiff costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees."'
Another defense to the consumer's warranty action other than contractual disclaimer is lack of privity."s At common law, courts conMagnuson-Moss Act Upon Consumer Product Warranties, 55 N.C. L. REV. 835 (1977);
Smith, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Turning the Table on Caveat Emptor, 13 CAL.
W. L. REv.391 (1977); Comment, Consumer Product Warranties Under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1977).
1' U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1976). An implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act means a
warranty arising under state sales law. Id. § 2301(7); see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability); U.C.C. § 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for particular
purpose); see Ventura v. Ford Motor Co., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 62, 433 A.2d 801, 807-10 (1981)
(disclaimer of implied warranties in sale of new car was invalid under Magnuson-Moss Act).
" 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (1976).
,4
I. § 2304(a)(2) (1976). The Magnuson-Moss Act does not require the seller to give
any warranties. See Gates v. Chrysler Corp., 397 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. App. 1981) (Magnuson-Moss Act does not apply unless seller attempts to restrict, modify, or disclaim implied
warranties). The intent of the authors of the Magnuson-Moss Act was to force sellers,
through competitive pressures, to offer full warranties. See 120 CONG. REC. 40, 172 (1974)
(remarks of Sen. Magnuson). A full warranty is a warranty that meets the federal minimum
standards for warranties. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(1). To meet the federal minimum standards for
warranties, the warrantor must remedy the defective product within a reasonable time and
without charge, not impose any limitation on the duration of any implied warranty, not exclude or limit consequential damages for breach of warranty unless the exclusion conspicuously appears on the face of the warranty, and permit the consumer to elect either a refund
for or replacement of the defective product. Id. § 2304(a).
I's
15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1976). State law defines the extent to which a consumer who is
not in contactual privity with a manufacturer can bring a breach of warranty action against
the manufacturer. See Mendelson v. General Motors Corp., 105 Misc. 2d 346, 352, 432N.Y.S.2d 132, 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (state law controls vertical privity since warranties
arise from state law), affd, 441 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1981); text accompanying notes 129-30 infra
(distinction between vertical and horizontal privity).
"' See Novosel v. Northway Motor Car Corp., 460 F. Supp. 541, 545 (N.D.N.Y. 1978)
(state law determines applicable damages in breach of warranty action under MagnusonMoss Act).
11 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (1976); see Oswald v. General Motors Corp., 594 F.2d 1106,
1136-37 (7th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979). The Oswald court noted that the
Magnuson-Moss Act provides the consumer with a more adequate remedy than is otherwise
available under the UCC, since the successful plaintiff in a breach of warranty action
brought under the Magnuson-Moss Act can recover the costs of litigation from the defendant. Id.
..See note 18 supra (definition of privity). See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 18, at
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sidered the seller's warranty to be contractual in nature and permitted
only the one in contractual privity, the seller's immediate buyer who had
made a sales contract with the seller, to sue the seller for breach of his
warranty.'19 The UCC abolished the strict privity rule and extends the
seller's warranty beyond the buyer of the goods.'" The UCC provides
three alternative provisions to govern privity, Alternatives A, B, and
C.21 Alternative A, which most states have adopted,'22 extends the
seller's warranties beyond the buyer to members of the buyer's family,
his household, or guests in his home who suffer personal injury as a
result of the seller's breach of warranty."3 Alternative B, which six
states have adopted, 4 extends the seller's warranties beyond the buyer
to any natural person whom the seller reasonably may expect to use,
consume, or be affected by the goods and who suffers personal injuries
as a result of the seller's breach of warranty.'2 5 Alternative C is similar
to Alternative B with the difference that Alternative C extends the
seller's warranties to buyers who suffer any injury from the seller's
breach, while Alternative B extends the seller's warranties only to
buyers who suffer personal injuries. Alternative C, which eleven states
have adopted,"6 is identical to Alternative B excpet that the injured per"' Trnas World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 482, 148 N.Y.S.2d
284, 287 (1955) (dictum). See generally 8 WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 998.
"o See U.C.C. § 2-318 (extension of UCC warranties to consumers not in contractual
privity with seller). See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, §§ 11-3 to -7, at 401-11.
12 U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternatives A, B, and C.
' ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.318 (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2335 (1967); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 85-2-318 (1961); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-318 (West Supp. 1980); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 23:2-318 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.318 (West Supp. 1981) (includes employees,
servants, and agents of buyer); GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-2-318 (1979); IDAHO CODE § 23-2-318
(1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-318 (Smith-Hurd 1963); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-2-318 (Burns
1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355-2-318 (Baldwin 1972); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2318
(1967); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-318 (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-318 (Vernon 1965); MONT.
REV. CODE ANN. § 87A-2-318 (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-318 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. §
104.2318 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-318 (West 1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-318 (1978);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-318 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.31 (Page 1979); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (West 1963); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3180 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
2318 (Purdon Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-318 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
62A:2-318 (1966); W. VA. CODE § 46-2-318 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 402.318 (West 1969).
123 U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative A. See generally Cochran, Emerging Products Liability
Under Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Survey, 29 Bus. LAW. 925, 926-29
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Cochran].
124 ALA. CODE § 7-2-318 (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-318 (1975) (personal injury not
required); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-318 (Supp. 1981); N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney Supp.
1981); S.C. CODE § 36-2-318 (1977) (warranties extend to personal and property damage); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-318 (1966).
'25 U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative B. See generally Cochran, supra note 123, at 929-31.
"' COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-318 (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 490:2-318 (1976); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 554.2318 (West Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-318 (West Supp. 1980); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-a:2-318 (Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-35 (1968); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 6A-2-318 (Supp. 1981); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-318 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §
70A-2-318 (1980); VA. CODE § 8.2-318 (1975); WYO. STAT. § 34-21-235 (1977).
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son may recover damages for any injury, personal or economic." A
beneficiary of warranties under any of these alternatives can bring a
direct action against the seller."
The UCC extends the seller's warranties horizontally, from the
buyer of the goods to other consumers or users of the goods. 129 The extent to which warranties extend vertically, or from the manufacturer
and wholesaler to the ultimate user of the goods, depends upon the development of case law in each jurisdiction. 3 ' Many courts have gone
beyond the UCC and abolsihed lack of vertical privity as a defense in
breach of warranty cases, permitting consumers to bring breach of warranty actions directly against remote sellers. 3' For example, in Morrow
v. New Moon Homes, Inc.,32 the Alaska Supreme Court expressly
abolished the vertical privity requirement in sales of consumer goods
and permitted a purchaser of a mobile home, who purchased the mobile
home from a retailer, to recover damages directly from the manufacturer for breach of implied warranty." Eight states have adopted
statutes abolishing lack of privity as a defense in consumers' breach of
warranty actions.3
While the trend is toward abolishing privity requirements, 35 some
courts continue to restrict the consumer's ability to bring an action for
breach of implied warranty." A consumer generally does not need to be
1 U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative C. See generally Cochran, supra note 123, at 931-34.
,, U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 2.
,, See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 287-88, 288 n.25 (Alaska 1976)
(UCC extends horizontal privity but is silent on vertical privity). See generally WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 20, § 11-3, at 403.
. "I See Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 234, 246 A.2d 848, 855-56 (1968)
(UCC
leaves extent of vertical privity to courts). See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20,
§ 11-3, at 403.
"I E.g., Bishop v. Sales, 336 So. 2d 1340, 1341-44 (Ala. 1976); Pust v. Union Supply Co.,
38 Colo. App. 435, 445, 561 P.2d 355, 363 (1976) (by implication), affid, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d
276 (1978) (en banc); Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 309 Minn. 106, 113-15, 244 N.W.2d
105, 107-10 (1976); Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 232-35, 246 A.2d 848, 855-56 (1968).
132 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
13 Id at 287-89.
13 ARK. STAT. ANN. §

(Supp. 1981); MD.

CoM.

85-2-318.1 (West Supp. 1981); ME.

§ 2-318
ch. 106, §

REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,

LAW CODE ANN. § 2-318 (1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

2-318 (West Supp. 1979); MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (Supp. 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
382-A:2-318 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-104 (1980); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-108

(1980).
&FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, Introduction, § [1][61; WHITE &
supranote 20, § 11-7, at 411; Jaeger, Privityof Warranty:Hasthe Tocsin Sounded?,
1 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1963).
" See, e.g., Watkins v. Barber-Colman Co., 625 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying
Georgia law) (absence of privity prevented employee of purchaser from recovering damages
for breach of warranty from seller of allegedly defective machinery); Chance v. Richards
Mfg. Co., 499 F. Supp. 102, 103-05 (E.D. Wash. 1980) (absence of privity prevented purchaser
of allegedly defective hip prosthesis from recovering damages against manufacturer of prosthesis for breach of warranty).
" See generally 2 FRUMER

SUMMERS,
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in privity with a seller, however, to bring an action for breach of express
warranty.13 In a state whose courts restrictively interpret privity requirements for implied warranty actions, therefore, consumers may
have broader protection under express warranties than implied warranties. 1
In addition to the defenses of lack of privity and contractual
disclaimers, the seller may rely on the buyer's failure to give notice of
breach as a defense to a breach of warranty action. 139 The UCC provides
that the buyer must give notice of breach to the seller within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the breach
or the buyer will be barred from any remedy.4 However, the UCC distinguishes a reasonable time in the case of a consumer from a reasonable
time in the case of a merchant buyer.' The purpose of notice, the official
commentary states, is to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a
good faith consumer of his remedy.1 42 A reasonable time in the case of a
consumer, therefore, is a longer time than a reasonable time in the case
of a merchant buyer.'
In cases involving personal injuries to consumers, courts have extended and in some cases have abolished the notice requirement for the
reason that in such cases notice would not give the seller an opportunity
to cure or to minimize damages.4 Other courts consider a buyer's prompt
13 See, e.g., Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 2d 104, 114-15, 114 n.8, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681,
687-88, 687 n.8, 534 P.2d 377, 383-84, 383 n.8 (1975) (en banc) (lack of privity did not bar
breach of express warranty action against manufacturer of golf training device); Indust-RiChem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d 282, 287-88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (lack of
privity did not bar breach of express warranty action against manufacturer of defective
steel drums). See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, § 11-7, at 410-11.
13 Compare Fowler v. General Elec. Co., 40 N.C. App. 301, 306-07, 252 S.E.2d 862,
864-65 (1979) (lack of privity barred breach of implied warranty action against manufacturer
of refrigerator) and Williams v. General Motors Corp., 19 N.C. App. 337, 340, 198 S.E.2d
766, 768 (1973) (lack of privity barred breach of implied warranty action against manufacturer of automobile) with Williams v. Hyatt Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 308, 312,
269 S.E.2d 184, 187-88 (1980) (lack of privity did not bar breach of express warranty action
against manufacturer of automobile) and Kinlaw v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 298 N.C. 494,
501-02, 259 S.E.2d 552, 554 (1979) (lack of privity did not bar breach of express warranty action against manufacturer of tractor).
"' See generally 2A FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, § 19.05[1]; Phillips, Notice of
Breach in Sales and Strict Tort Liability Law: Should There Be A Difference?, 47 IND. L.J.
457 (1972); Note, Notice of Breach and the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 U. FLA. L. REV.
520 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Notice].
10 U.C.C. § 2-607(3). See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, § 11-10, at 421-26.
U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4.
...
11 Id.; see Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 977 (5th
Cir. 1976). Courts measure the merchant's good faith by reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-103(1}(b)).
13 U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4.
...
E.g., Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 312, 363 A.2d 460, 465 (1976;
Fischer v. Mead Johnson Laboratories, 41 A.D.2d 737, 737-38, 341 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259 (1973).
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notice to the retailer to be constructive notice to the manufacturer. 4 5
Courts also tend to allow long delays by consumers in giving notice when
the seller is not prejudiced by the delay. 6 In Maybank v. S.S. Kresge
Co., " 7 for example, a flashcube exploded and caused personal injuries to
a consumer.1 8 The only notice the consumer gave to the sellers of the
defective flashcube was when the consumer filed a breach of warranty
action against the sellers three years after the injury. "' The North
Carolina Supreme Court held that since the sellers suffered no prejudice
from the delay, the consumer's delay in giving notice was not unreasonable.'50 In most cases in which the consumer fails to give any notice
before filing a complaint, however, the lack of notice bars the consumer
from recovery.''
The notice requirement puts a minimal burden on consumers. Some
courts interpreted the Uniform Sales Act to require that the notice
specify particular defects and indicate whether the buyer intended to
seek damages."2 Under the UCC, however, notice is sufficient as long as
the buyer informs the seller that the transaction was not satisfactory to
the buyer and requires further attention."3 For example, oral notification is sufficient." 4 In one case, the buyer of a defective car had the car
"5 E.g., Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 618 P.2d 657, 660-61 (Colo. 1980) (en banc); Santor v.
A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 68, 207 A.2d 305, 313 (1965).
"' See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 298-99 (3d Cir.

1961) (decided under Uniform Sales Act) (10 months delay in giving notice while plaintiff
was in hospital not unreasonable); Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 349-50,
378 N.E.2d 1083, 1087-89 (1978) (four years delay in giving notice following plaintiff's stroke
not unreasonable); see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, § 11-10, at 423 (courts will tolerate
delay when buyer suffers personal injury).
:47 302 N.C. 129, 273 S.E.2d 681 (1981).
Id. at 132-33, 273 S.E.2d at 682.
"' Id.
at 134-36, 273 S.E.2d at 683-85.
" Id. at 137,273 S.E.2d at 685; accord, Davidson v. Wee, 93 Ariz. 191, 379 P.2d 744, 749
(1963) (en banc) (decided under Uniform Sales Act) (complaint filed two months after injury
was suficient notice).
"I E.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Struct. Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 510-13 (Alaska
1980); Voboril v. Namco Leisure World, Inc., 24 U.C.C. REP. SRV. 614, 614-15 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1978). The Voboril court noted that since the purpose of notice is to allow the parties to
begin settlement negotiations, see note 159 infra, allowing a complaint to serve as notice
would defeat the purpose of the notice requirement. Id.
"I See, e.g., American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corp., 7 F.2d 565, 566 (2d Cir. 1925) (notice must give seller early warning that buyer will
seek damages); Aaron Bodek & Son v. Avrach, 297 Pa. 225, 230, 146 A. 546, 547-48 (1929)
(notice must specify defect with reasonable particularity); see 8 WILLISTON, supra note 13, §
993, at 599-600 (decisions under Uniform Sales Act often held buyers to high standard of
notice).
1- U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4.
11 See e.g., Jay V. Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 1198, 1204 (E.D.
Mo. 1971) (telephone calls by buyer to seller were sufficient notice of breach to seller of
molds); Page v. Camper City & Mobile Home Sales, 292 Ala. 562, 565, 297 So. 2d 810, 811-12
(Ala. 1974) (personal notification by buyer to seller of defects was sufficient notice). But see
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towed to the seller's place of business and informed the seller's employees
that the car needed major repairs. 55' In the buyer's breach of warranty action against the seller, the court found that the buyer's actions gave the
seller sufficient notice that the seller had breached its implied warranties. 56'
The UCC notice requirement serves a useful purpose. The notice requirement provides the seller with some protection against false
claims.'57 The seller who receives prompt notice that the goods he sold
are defective may be able to cure the defect and minimize damages."'
Prompt notice also allows the parties to commence settlement negotiations and avoid litigation.'59 Besides protecting sellers, the notice requirement also benefits consumers. If the buyer notifies the seller promptly of
a defect in the seller's product, the seller can halt production of the product and remove other defective products from the market, thereby protecting other consumers from injury.'60
Although the purpose of strict liability is to free consumers from the
complexity of sales law and the accompanying contract defenses,'' strict
liability has achieved its purpose only in part. The disagreements among
courts over whether strict liability applies to economic losses,'62 used
goods,' and nondangerous defective goods' indicates that strict liability suffers from doctrinal confusion.'65 In contrast, the warranties of the
UCC apply to these areas,'66 and therefore in some cases provide consumers with broader protection than strict liability. In addition, liberal
interpretations of the UCC in favor of consumers and legislation at the
state and federal level have extended the scope of the consumer's warranty protection and have eroded the seller's traditional defenses to the
Prompt Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 492 F. Supp. 344, 347-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (oral
notification not sufficient when contract required written notice).
15 Overland Bond & Inv. Co. v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 355, 292 N.E.2d 168, 171
(1972).
1 Id. at 354-55, 292 N.E.2d at 176.
157 See Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 826-27 (6th Cir.
1978) (notice minimizes possibility of prejudice to seller by allowing seller opportunity to inspect goods and investigate claim), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); Notice, supra note 139,
at 525 (most prevalent rationale for notice requirement is to prevent fraudulent claims
against seller).
11 See L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 438 S.W.2d 717, 719-20 (1969)
(purpose of notice requirement is to enable seller to minimize damages).
"' Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Struct. Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 512 (Alaska 1980)
(overriding purpose of notice requirement is to encourage settlement); U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4 (notice should open way for settlement).
160Notice, supra note 139, at 523-24.
"I See text accompanying note 31 supra.
182 See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra.
18 See text accompnaying notes 57-63 supra.
184 See text accompanying notes 69-77 supra.
18 See generally Owen, supra note 59, at 681-85 (attributing doctrinal confusion to lack
of uniform principles governing strict liability).
18 See text accompanying notes 51-56, 64-68, 78-85 supra.
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consumer's warranty action. Contrary to prediction, 7 warranties have
not passed quietly down the drain, but challenge strict liability as the
consumer's best means of recovering damages from sellers of defective
goods.
WILLIAM R. CLEMENT, JR.

...
See text accompanying note 2 supra.

